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including the US. While US assumptions and policies on organised crime and its control are 
embodied and codified by international laws which reflect the US war on drugs from the 1970s 
onwards, there is a dearth of  interdisciplinary works which challenge the application of  such 
policies in small island developing states (SIDS). The purpose of  this paper is to critically analyse 
the exportation of  organised crime control policies from the US to Caribbean SIDS, in light of  
the dichotomy which exists between these countries in identifying security threats, and to 
generate evidence-informed soft policy implications. Through an analysis of  empirical research 
data, combined with the examination of  US backed policies and assumptions, it can be concluded 
that international policies adopted by Caribbean SIDS are inappropriate and not fit for purpose, 
given the local conditions of  organised crime security threats in these countries. Moreover, the 
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In the present day, international policy responses designed to combat organised crime, are 
generally constructed around a blueprint that reflects the historical United States (US) 
war on drugs. This international-norm making template embodies the unchallenged 
assumption that organised crime at the wider level—including drug trafficking—poses a 
serious international security threat to all nation states, including Western, developed 
countries such as the US. These assumptions are embodied and codified by international 
laws reflecting the US anti-narcotics crusade from the 1970s onwards (Nadelmann, 
1993:189-199, Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Woodiwiss, 2005:149-159) and are subsequently 
absorbed by the international community. It is the scale of  the aforementioned threat 
from organised crime which justifies “the extensive legal and regulatory framework that 
has been constructed” by the international community (Harvey & Sittlington, 2018: 422).  
For example, in the context of  drug  trafficking, the United Nations (UN) Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (Vienna 
Convention), attaches a strong priority to drugs as an international security issue, while 
mirroring the US own preoccupation with drugs as a national security issue (Joseph, 
2001:11). With parties to the Vienna Convention obliged to establish a wide range of  
drug-related criminal offences under their domestic laws, it is evident that law 
enforcement decisions concerning the control of  illicit drugs, are predicated on the 
framed US assumption that drug trafficking remains a primary, global security threat.  
  
The international community, including Caribbean small island developing states 
(SIDS) (UN-OHRLLS, 2011), has embraced US assumptions and policies to address the 
threat of  drug trafficking. For example, the Bahamas was an original signatory to the 
Vienna Convention, signing on 20 December 1988. Since then, all Caribbean states 
(including 16 SIDS), have ratified the Vienna Convention, underlining the importance of  
international anti-drugs laws at the regional level (Griffith, 2000:183). The accession of  
Caribbean SIDS including Jamaica (the country case study for this research), to the 
Vienna Convention is a powerful testimony of  the obligations these developing states 
have accepted to tackle drugs trafficking (Smellie, 2004:104). Another example of  the 
international narrative informing the rhetoric of  regional law enforcement bodies, is 
evidenced by a Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) press release, in which the JCF stated 
that drug trafficking, “poses a significant threat to the country’s stability and security” 
(JCF, 2017). The press release also emphasised the role of  Jamaica, “as a transhipment 
port to get illicit drugs into North America and Europe”. Alongside Jamaica, other 
Caribbean developing countries, including the Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic and 
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Haiti, are identified by the US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 
Volume I Drug and Chemical Control (March 2018) as, “Major Illicit Drug Producing 
and Major Drug-Transit Countries”; therefore presenting as security threats to the US 
(INCSR, 2018). The scale of  this threat is deemed to justify extensive regulatory 
responses, notably the allocation of  substantial US funding to countries for attempting to 
combat regional drug trafficking.  
 
The purpose of  this paper is to examine the exportation of  organised crime 
control policies from the US to Caribbean SIDS, in light of  the dichotomy which exists 
between these countries in identifying security threats, and to generate evidence-informed 
soft policy implications for Caribbean SIDS. Using Jamaica as a country case study to 
highlight the crime issues faced by Caribbean SIDS at the wider level, the paper will show 
that although US assumptions and policies concerning organised crime and its control 
are generally embraced by the international community, the same policies adopted by 
Caribbean SIDS are inappropriate and not fit for purpose, given the peculiarities and local 
conditions of  organised crime security threats in these countries. It is the objective of  the 
authors, that this paper will re-orientate a long standing misreading of  the Caribbean 
reality, for a more accurate one. Specifically, and as this paper will demonstrate, that 
modern organised crime policies shaped around historical anti-drugs laws are not fit for 
purpose in the context of  combating firearms trafficking in Caribbean SIDS.  
 
The authors argue there exists a greater need for the empirical, qualitative 
investigation and critical analysis of  the exportation of  organised crime control policies 
from the US to Caribbean SIDS. It may be observed that a lack of  research in this specific 
area reflects the general acceptance of  the international legal community—scholars and 
policy makers alike—of  US assumptions that drug trafficking is the dominant, antecedent 
organised crime and thus presents the biggest security threat. The weight of  such threat 
imagery is further amplified, because the international legal community tends to accept 
that policy assumptions arising from the institutional responses of  other countries 
(notably the US and UK) are correct when applied to those States which are deemed to 
host the threat (for example, Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago). Although a discussion 
on post-colonial political history and policing in the Caribbean, and its inextricable link 
with racist ideologies, is outside the parameters of  this article (see for example, Anderson 
and Killingray 1991, 1992; Agozino, 2004; Bowling, 2010, Lodge et al, 2015), it remains 
necessary to underline that the research for this paper was carried out in a region of  the 
world that is majority black and which possesses, “a complex and often bloody history 
that can be traced back a long time” (Agozino et al, 2009: 288).  Much like Agozino et al 
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(2009:288), the “legacy of  the region’s colonial past—genocide, slavery, the plantation 
economy and much else” is too complex to be discussed in detail here. However, for the 
purposes of  this article, it must be stated from the outset, that the US war on drugs was 
a tactical decision by the Nixon Administration to damage the Black community (Lowe, 
2016) and conceal anti-democratic and radical tendencies within the American state 
(Woodiwiss, 2018:33, 42-43). This was revealed in Dan Baum’s 1994 interview with 
Nixon’s former domestic policy advisor John Ehrlichman (Baum, 2016), who confirmed 
that:  
 
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two 
enemies: the anti-war left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We 
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by 
getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, 
and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could 
arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them 
night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the 




 Indeed, it is this continued preoccupation of  the US with the war on drugs that 
has led to the creation and implementation of  organised crime control policies which are 
not fit for purpose in the context of  SIDS, and which remain grounded in imperialist and 
racist sentiment – yet such policies and assumptions are deemed to be correct because 
they are framed as responses to threats to the ‘national security interest’ of  the US (US 
Senate Caucus on International Narcotics,  Senator Dianne Feinstein, 2012). However, as 
clarified by Ceresola (2019:52) in his work on the US Government’s framing of  
corruption, the (incorrect) framing of  “public evils has ramifications for laws, legislation, 
and funding that affects individuals on the ground”. 
 
This paper argues that the US paradigm of  organised crime control policy 
continues to frame drug trafficking as the main problem in the Caribbean, and fails to 
recognise that in Jamaica—and other SIDS including Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago - 
the real issue is the illicit trafficking of  firearms from the US. Such a misdirection has 
consequences for “individuals on the ground”, (Ceresola 2019:52), including regional law 
enforcement officers who feel unable to attend to the most urgent matter of  firearms 
trafficking.  
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Jamaica is adopted as a country case study for this study, and acts as a template to 
highlight the general difficulties that all Caribbean SIDS face when obliged to transpose 
international conventions shaped by US assumptions and policies into their own national, 
legal frameworks. As will be shown, US-derived international agreements such as the 
Vienna Convention, do not fall onto a blank slate, but their reception is inevitably shaped 
by the local conditions, for example typical criminal activity in the country or region. The 
paper draws on qualitative, empirical research carried out with key actors from law 
enforcement agencies in Jamaica who also work with officials in other, regional SIDS. As 
a result, the interviewees were able to contextualise their thoughts in a broader, Caribbean 
context, therefore making them ideal subjects and additionally widening the significance 
of  this study. Part two, therefore, outlines the data collection methodology in terms of  
the research gathered from semi-structured interviews. Part three of  the paper delivers 
an overview of  the internationalisation of  US organised crime control, set against the 
backdrop of  US sentiments in this area. Section three (a) of  the paper focuses on US 
assumptions surrounding the threat of  drug trafficking, and how US policies have been 
embraced by the international community and incorporated into international laws to 
combat organised crime. Under section three (b), there is a discussion of  the acceptance 
of  US assumptions and policies in Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS, in the context of  
regional efforts to combat organised crime security threats. Parts four and five, are crucial 
to the discussion because at this juncture the empirical findings are discussed in relation 
to two main areas, these being identified problems and suggested re-conceptualisations. 
In section four (a) of  the paper, the discussion will draw on the interview data to challenge 
the persistent narrative and threat imagery of  drug trafficking as a security threat in 
Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS, and how this is used to justify costly and to date, futile 
maritime drug interdictions funded by the US. Section four (b) will use the empirical 
findings to shine a spotlight on the fact that in Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS alike, 
it is the illicit trade in firearms from the US which constitutes the main security threat, 
not drug trafficking. The findings therefore suggest that the exportation and 
development of  organised crime control policy from the US to Caribbean SIDS, should 
be refocused to reflect the substantial issue of  illicit firearms trafficking rather than built 
around outdated anti-narcotics assumptions. Part five of  the paper, draws on the 
interviews to deliver evidence-informed re-conceptualisations of  organised crime control 
in Jamaica—with a view to using these implications as a blueprint for the more 
appropriate application of  relevant legislation in other regional SIDS. These re-
conceptualisations include a) providing SIDS with greater powers to influence and decide 
on crime control policies that are tailored to the need of  the individual country; and b) 
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broad capacity development suggestions within the context of  local law enforcement and 






Data for this interdisciplinary paper comes from a broader study of  organised crime at 
the regional, Caribbean level, and builds on the pre-existing and collaborative interests 
of  the authors in law and history. Empirical data is drawn from in-depth interviews with 
law enforcement officers, to supplement the analysis of  secondary sources including 
academic literature, news and government reports. The work is further supported by a 
range of  primary sources including international legislation.  
 
Research for the paper was carried out over a period of  10 months from May 2017. 
The first phase of  the research encompassed existing literature searches and archive 
retrievals and culminated with a trip to Washington DC in September 2017, where data 
on US organised crime control policies was gathered. The second phase of  the research 
focused on face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with seven participants in Kingston, 
Jamaica in January 2018. There were four separate sittings with participants in Jamaica, 
and some of  the interview sessions had multiple participants opting to be interviewed 
together. It should be noted that group interviewing is not unusual in a highly sensitive 
setting (for example policing organised crime) where socio-cultural solidarity is the norm. 
All of  the interviews conducted for this project lasted approximately one or two hours. 
The interviews were transcribed and analysed between January and May 2018. All 
interviews were conducted in English.  
 
The researchers employed homogenous purposive sampling to select the 
interviewees, meaning that the interviewees shared similar characteristics in terms of  
their occupational jurisdiction. Some of  the participants also possessed similar ideologies 
within the wider context of  combating what they considered to be organised crime in a 
Caribbean SID such as Jamaica. Expert purposive sampling was used, as it allowed for the 
interviewees to be selected based on their expertise working in law enforcement agencies 
concerned with combating organised crime. The criteria used to select suitable 
interviewees required them to: work in an authoritative position for a relevant institution; 
possess specialist knowledge of  law enforcement methods and policies designed to 
combat organised crime in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean region; and have the time 
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available to speak freely and participate in the research. The selection criteria were further 
refined by assessing how appropriate the data provided by the participant was likely to be, 
both in terms of  relevance and depth. 
 
The authors are aware of  the limitations of  drawing upon data gathered from a 
small pool of  selected interview subjects, including the potential for confirmation bias as 
it may be that “ambiguous meta-communicative norms in the focus group influence the 
contributions of  other police participants” (Gilbert, 2017:341). However, an objective of  
the study was to examine the influence of  pressures exerted by Western law making on 
the thoughts, feelings and behaviour of  high ranking law enforcement officers in Jamaica 
who work in the specific area of  organised crime control and who have strong links with 
other countries in the region. As noted by Gilbert (2017), meta-communication (non-
verbal cues) between officers reveal to the interviewer otherwise unknown jurisdictional 
boundaries concerning professional identities. As a result, the interviews are rich, robust 
and encompass the analysis of  “embodied conduct” alongside language (Gilbert, 
2017:341). The authors assert that the paper does not employ confirmation bias or 
“wishful thinking”. Indeed, those who critique it as such, may wish to reflect on how 
reality may be “constructed” to support the vested interests of  policy makers or “claim-
makers” (Spector and Kitsuse, 2001; Ceresola, 2019:51). The paper will show, using 
historical evidence and current data (including the free comments and conversations 
collected during the interviews), that international policies designed to fight organised 
crime are generally not fit for purpose in Caribbean SIDS because they do not reflect the 
real state of  the problem.  
 
To conclude this section, the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity because of  
the sensitive nature of  the data and their high ranking positions in law enforcement. 
Interviewees have been accorded an alphabet letter ranging from A to G for identification. 
No further element of  identification can be attributed to the participants. 
 
3. The Exportation and Internationalisation of US Organised Crime 
Control Policies and Assumptions 
 
3(a) Drug Trafficking as the Antecedent Organised Crime and Main Security 
Threat  
 
At the international level, organised crime control in the sense it is understood today has 
a recent history. Its origins can be traced back to the assumptions and policies of  the 
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US—a country which considers itself  more advanced in combating organised crime than 
other countries and whose organised crime control methods are considered “best practice” 
(Woodiwiss, 2017:224). Indeed, modern day international organised crime control policies 
find their parentage in the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA) passed by the US 
Congress in 1970. The OCCA provided law enforcement and criminal justice agencies 
with greater powers to combat criminal conspiracies: asset forfeiture; special grand juries; 
wider witness immunity provisions for compelling or persuading reluctant witnesses; 
extended sentences for persons convicted in organised crime cases; and the use of  wire-
tapping and eavesdropping evidence in federal cases. In the same year as the OCCA, the 
Nixon administration secured the passing of  the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control 
Act of  1970. The law gave the Department of  Justice an array of  powers over licit and 
illicit drugs covering possession, sale and trafficking. Drug offenders faced severe 
sanctions including life for those engaged in “continuing criminal enterprise” or who 
qualified as a “dangerous special drug offender” (Trebach, 1982:237). US Treasury funds 
were made available to enforcement agents for the purposes of  hiring informants, paying 
for incriminating information, and making purchases of  contraband substances.  
Furthermore, agents were given the power to seize on sight any property they thought 
was contraband or forfeitable, and execute search warrants at any time of  the day or night 
(King, 1972). In effect, the laws passed in 1970 codified the US assumption that drug 
trafficking posed a serious security threat at the international level, and that prohibition 
was the most effective way of  dealing with the problem. From 1970 onward, the 
prohibition attempt was closely associated with efforts to export not just US anti-drug 
efforts, but also general anti-organised crime efforts, thereby signifying the 
internationalisation of  US organised crime control policies and assumptions. 
  
The US actively exported and internationalised its models of  organised crime and 
drug control in the year following the passage of  the OCCA. On 14 June 1971, President 
Richard Nixon summoned State department officials and ambassadors, to a meeting 
which stressed the need for a tougher stance abroad, in what the Americans were now 
calling the “war on drugs” (Peters and Wooley, 1971). A summary of  this meeting, states 
that the President considered the, “Ambassadors’ most important diplomatic mission” was 
to convey to drug producing and transshipment countries, that the US means business, 
concluding that “stopping the drug traffic is more important than good temporized 
relations” (Krogh, 1971). 
 
The US continued to assume that drug trafficking was an alien problem with 
foreign roots when in 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12435, 
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which established the Commission on Organized Crime (chaired by Judge Irving R 
Kaufman) and identified foreign-based drug trafficking organisations as posing the 
biggest security threat to the US (COC, 1983:5).  Drug producing and/or transshipment 
countries which were assumed to present a security threat to the US, found that failing to 
cooperate with US drug prohibition policies meant subjecting themselves to various 
sanctions, including the withdrawal of  American aid and increases in duties and tariffs. A 
1987 US General Accounting Office report (GAO, 1987:34-36), spelt out the sanctions 
approach in the context of  international drug control as follows:  
 
The US international narcotics control program is based on convincing foreign 
governments to control illicit drugs when additional leverage is necessary and 
appropriate, the 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of  Drug Abuse and Drug 
Trafficking calls for US decisions on foreign aid and other matters to be tied to 
the willingness of  the recipient country to execute a narcotics enforcement 
program. 
 
In order to ensure compliance with US policies, the report further detailed the 
necessity to withhold, “50 percent of  the economic and military assistance allocated to 
major illicit drug producing countries”, and that the reduction in aid was automatic unless 
the President certified to the Congress that a country had “cooperated with the United 
States” to control the illicit narcotics trade, including “distribution into the United States” 
(GAO, 1987:34-36).  
 
There is no doubt that US assumptions and policies about drugs and organised 
crime played a role in the diplomatic processes that led to the inception of  the Vienna 
Convention being adopted. David Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor to the State 
Department and a member of  the US delegation to the International Conference where 
the Vienna Convention was adopted, noted that “[t]he US participated actively in the 
negotiation of  the Convention, and many of  its provisions reflect legal approaches and 
devices already found in US law” (Stewart, 1990:387). The widespread acceptance of  the 
Vienna Convention can be seen as a significant stage in the internationalisation of  US 
drug prohibition policies, whereby US sentiments on the subject were absorbed by the 
UN and the international community. The rhetoric that there is a drugs war which can 
be fought and won, does not abate and is fuelled by discussions such as those emanating 
from the UN General Assembly Special Session on the world drug problem from 19 to 21 
April 2016, in New York. At the session, the UN reaffirmed its commitment to 
prohibitionist policies in an attempt to combat the global drug problem, when it adopted 
a Resolution titled, “Our joint commitment to effectively addressing and countering the 
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world drug problem” (UN A/RES/S-30/1:2016). Observers will note the close 
resemblance of  the title to the aims and objectives of  the OCCA; namely, that the US 
means business in its attempt to combat drug trafficking. To summarise, the assumptions 
and policies of  the US concerning drug trafficking (and organised crime at the wider 
level), have been embraced by the international community and incorporated into 
international policy making. As will be shown in section three (b), while the Caribbean 
region has adopted the position of  the US concerning organised crime and its control, in 
reality these assumptions inform flawed policy decisions at the national level. The 
example of  Jamaica as a country case study representative of  other Caribbean SIDS 
demonstrates this (see below). 
 
3(b) US Assumptions and Policies on Organised Crime in the Caribbean 
 
It is the general and predominant belief  of  international law enforcement agencies that 
drug trafficking is the dominant form of  organised crime which is linked to other serious 
crimes, including firearms trafficking and financial crime; thereby leveraging it to the 
most visible of  security threats faced by the international community (EMCDDA, 2016). 
The internationalisation of  US assumptions on the subject, suggests that organised crime 
in the Caribbean is viewed by policy making bodies, including the UN Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) as an omnipresent threat to national, regional and international 
security which undermines the social, economic and political stability of  the region 
(UNODC TOC, 2012). Considered a global security threat, the paradigm of  international 
organised crime control policy making, adopts drug trafficking as the antecedent factor 
which serves to aggravate many other types of  criminal activities which further 
destabilise and undermine Caribbean security (INTERPOL, 2016). The UNODC asserts 
that drug trafficking “issues are apparent within Central America and the Caribbean” 
(UNODC TOC, 2012:9); arguably an assumption which has been framed by the policy 
making body in light of  claims made by the likes of  William Brownfield, formerly 
Assistant Secretary, US Bureau of  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
who stated in 2014 that drug trafficking in the Caribbean is, “likely to get worse before it 
gets better” (Brownfield, 2014). These assumptions reinforce the persistent threat mantra 
associated with Caribbean drug trafficking. Figures released by the UN maintain the 
rhetoric that the Caribbean is a hub for drug traffickers, and in 2017, the UNODC World 
Drug Report, confirmed that, “90 per cent of  the cocaine intercepted in 2015 was in the 
Americas”, including in the “transit regions of  Central America and the Caribbean” 
(UNODC WDR, 2017:27). 
 
 Young & Woodiwiss – Organised Crime and Security Threats in Caribbean Small Island Developing States                 96 
 
 
As evidenced above, international norm making bodies, identify the Caribbean as 
somehow complicit in the problem of  drug trafficking. Following the creation of  the 
Vienna Convention, the 1990s heralded the start of  a large movement in terms of  law 
making and enforcement bodies trying to combat drug trafficking and related offences 
such as money laundering. Indeed, US assumptions were embraced by the regional, 
Organisation of  American States (OAS) General Assembly, when it issued the Declaration 
and Program of  Action of  Ixtapa (Mexico) on 2 April 1990 (OAS, 1990), and generally 
declared drug trafficking a “crime against humanity” (Young, 2013:85). Two months 
earlier on 15 February 1990, in a presidential guesthouse situated in the Cartagena Bay 
area of  Colombia, US President George H W Bush, President Virgilio Barco Vargas of  
Colombia, President Jaime Paz Zamora of  Bolivia, and President Alan Garcia Perez of  
Peru (Peters and Wooley, 1990), jointly issued the Declaration of  Cartagena which 
promised an unprecedented, concerted and continuing battle against drug trafficking. By 
proxy, any counter narcotics efforts carried out by the OAS and its autonomous regional 
organisation, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, would by extension 
apply not only to those States traditionally deemed as being located in Central America, 
but to all 35 Independent Member States of  the OAS—including Caribbean SIDS such 
as Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
Nearly two decades later, it was made clear that drug trafficking remained a 
Caribbean-grown security threat, when in April 2009, at the Fifth Summit of  the 
Americas, in Port of  Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, US President Barack Obama addressed 
a gathering of  leaders from OAS countries. President Obama informed them of  “a new 
initiative to invest US$30 million to strengthen cooperation on security in the Caribbean” 
(Obama, 2009), which would later be known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative 
(CBSI). Reiterating the assumptions of  previous US governments, Obama outlined a 
renewed commitment to reducing illicit drug flows and increasing security in the 
Caribbean. The CBSI would provide Caribbean countries struggling to “stem the 
resurgent tide of  drug trafficking”, “with technical assistance, equipment and training to 
combat crime and drug smuggling. This includes setting up detection dog units, 
improving prisons, providing cargo scanners, polygraphs and interceptor boats, and 
sharing more information with local security forces” (Wigglesworth, 2013). In the same 
year, on 8 October, the General Assembly of  the UN Social, Humanitarian and Cultural 
Affairs Committee hosted a debate on Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice and Drug 
Control. At the debate, Raymond Wolfe, a Jamaican representative of  the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), highlighted that the international drug trade is “inextricably 
linked to the problem of  crime, particularly transnational organised crimes”, and that 
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illicit drugs remained a major concern in the Caribbean; a region which serves as a “bridge 
between the major producers and consumers of  illicit drugs” (UNGA, 2009). The press 
release for the debate, unconsciously highlighted that countries in the region had 
embraced US assumptions and polices, when it stated that a “successful fight against drug 
trafficking and transnational organised crime” was certainly attainable with the 
implementation of  “interlocking national, regional and international strategies rooted in 
global cooperation” (UNGA, 2009).  
  
On 27 May 2010 the US Attorney General Eric Holder officially launched the 
CBSI partnership between the US and the Caribbean, as “a new chapter” in US-Caribbean 
relations (USDOJ, 2010). Holder’s speech at the Inaugural Caribbean-US Security 
Cooperation Dialogue was delivered three days after Jamaican soldiers and police had 
fought a protracted and bloody battle in the Tivoli Gardens area of  Kingston, with 
“armed supporters of  a fugitive alleged drug lord [Christopher “Dudus” Coke]” who was 
facing US extradition (Helps, 2010). In the aftermath of  the Tivoli siege, Holder 
expressed renewed US commitment to the Caribbean and vowed to “combat drug 
trafficking and other criminal activity” in the region. Holder further confirmed the 
support of  the US Department of  Justice and the Departments of  State, Homeland 
Security and Defense in ensuring that combating drug trafficking in the Caribbean region 
would remain a “top priority” (Helps, 2010). By June 2011, US Secretary of  State, Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, announced to CARICOM Foreign Ministers in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 
that the US would increase its financial support to the CBSI, with US$77 million pledged 
in funding for fiscal year 2011/12. Clinton added that, “the amount represents an increase 
of  more than 70 per cent over the US$45 million allocated in the first year of  
implementation in 2010” (Miller, 2011). By the twenty-first Century, the 
internationalisation of  US assumptions and policies on drug trafficking and organised 
crime which had begun with Nixon was cemented, as the international community 
embraced a tougher stance on drugs in the Caribbean with the guarantee of  substantial 
US funding for those SIDS attempting to combat the problem. However, as will be shown 
below using the case study of  Jamaica, US attempts to curb drug trafficking (and 
therefore control organised crime), in the Caribbean have proved largely futile as law 
enforcement officers recognise that the “pressure on us [from the international 
community]…to come up with statistics” (A) to satisfy US assumptions on organised 
crime, means the implementation of  flawed policies which “don’t apply to a country like 
Jamaica” (A).  
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4. Jamaica: An Instrumental Case Study 
 
This part of  the paper draws upon the supplemental research data from interviews with 
law enforcement officers, to use Jamaica as an instrumental and illustrative case study to 
highlight the futility of  transposing US assumptions and policies concerning organised 
crime and its control onto Caribbean SIDS. The free comments, conversations and 
responses to specific questions, made during the course of  the interviews, shape the 
direction of  this section of  the work.  
 
Jamaica and its neighbouring SIDS are still developing in the face of  specific social, 
economic and environmental vulnerabilities (UN-OHRLLS, 2011), yet they receive 
substantial funding from the US to try and combat organised crime threats, notably drug 
trafficking. What will become evident from the research under section four (a) is that the 
specific, regional vulnerabilities peculiar to Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS, are not 
reflected in the general US-informed, international policies to combat organised crime as 
these are shaped around the anti-drug paradigm. The example of  futile maritime drug 
interdictions proves this. Section four (b) of  the paper will highlight that the misdirection 
of  funding to combat the perceived problems of  drugs in Caribbean SIDS, substantially 
overshadows a much greater issue for these countries, this being the illicit trafficking of  
firearms which are manufactured in the US. 
 
4(a) Americanisation of  Jamaican Crime Control: Futility of  Maritime Drug 
Interdictions 
 
This paper has shown that since the 1970s, Caribbean SIDS have been framed as a 
challenge to global security, because of  their involvement with the illicit drug trade. By 
the time of  the Vienna Convention in 1988, Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS, were 
identified by the US as problematic countries concerning the transshipment of  cocaine 
and the production of  marijuana. For example, The Bahamian drug trafficking route 
(favoured by Jamaicans to move marijuana and cocaine), caused such consternation for the 
US that in fiscal year 1988, the US GAO reported that, “US-supported anti-drug 
programs and operations in the Bahamas aimed at reducing the flow of  drugs through 
the Bahamas and into the United States cost about US$33 million” (GAO, 1990:10), with 
US$18 million of  that amount going to the US Coastguard to strengthen drug 
interdiction capacity (GAO, 1990:37). By May 1997, Jamaica had signed a cooperation 
agreement with the US to suppress maritime drug trafficking—also known as the 
Shiprider Agreement—which entered into force on March 10, 1998. Other developing 
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nations in the Caribbean also signed Shiprider Agreements with the US toward the end 
of  the nineties, including The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, and Haiti. The Shiprider Agreements were seen as a “solution” to 
regional instability and in a passage from his 1996 paper on the Agreements—the rhetoric 
of  which, bears a striking similarity to the Nixon-era narrative of  the war on drugs—the 
controversial Assistant Secretary of  State for Inter-American Affairs during the Reagan 
Administration, Elliott Abrams, stated that, “reliance on a foreign power may be the most 
sensible form of  nationalism”, (1996:86) for Caribbean SIDS and urged them to recognise 
that “the only major power that cares deeply about the Caribbean is the one that has a 
border there” (1996:99). Such a statement frames the Shiprider Agreements and other 
similar policies, as being created to protect the interests of  Caribbean SIDS, when in fact, 
the Agreements were constructed to protect and strengthen US national security against 
the purported drug trafficking threat posed by the Caribbean Basin (1996:87)—in 
accordance with Nixon’s policies from the 1970s (see parts one and three above). 
 
In the wake of  the Shiprider Agreements and under the auspices of  programmes 
such as the CBSI, the US continues to allocate substantial funds for maritime drug 
interdiction operations in the region. In 2017, the US INCSR reported that, “[l]arger 
“go-fast” and sport fishing vessels transport marijuana from Jamaica both to the Bahamas 
and through the Bahamas into Florida” (INCSR, 2017:100). Later that year, boats worth 
US$500 million were donated to Jamaica by the US. At the time, then opposition leader 
Andrew Holness (later elected Prime Minister of  Jamaica) commented that the 
expenditure was wasteful and funding would be better spent on “practical areas that will 
have a more direct impact on the country’s crime problem” (Gleaner, 2017a). In particular, 
the support provided to bolster and strengthen the Jamaica Defence Force Coast Guard 
in their pursuit of  maritime drug trafficking, is both costly to the US and ties the hands 
of  its Jamaica recipients to a drug control template designed by the US, but which is not 
fit for purpose in Jamaica.  
 
The sentiment of  Holness, concerning the futility of  maritime anti-narcotics 
funding, was a view echoed by all interviewees. Moreover, the presence of  such views in 
the common discourse of  Jamaican law enforcement officers, underlines commonly held 
values which are rooted in their deep dissatisfaction of  the American way of  combating 
organised crime including drug trafficking in the Caribbean. US driven maritime counter-
narcotics efforts in and around the waters of  Jamaica and regional SIDS are largely 
redundant for a number of  reasons. First, as stated by one interviewee, law enforcement 
bodies in Caribbean SIDS, “are given boats. The boats don’t come with a service plan, 
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they are expensive to maintain and run, so once the first few months are over we can’t 
afford to keep them out at sea” (B). The point made by this particular interviewee was 
echoed by all participants, and is indicative of  an issue which surrounds aid funding in 
general, at the wider global level; that those who donate the funding are “typically not 
accountable to their intended beneficiaries” (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). Ergo, in the 
context of  combatting drug trafficking in the Caribbean, a substantial amount of  US 
money is allocated for use by SIDS to carry out maritime narcotics interdictions. However, 
because of  the lack of  checks and balances and general dialogue between the US and the 
end user, it follows that maritime infrastructure is delivered with “no follow ups” (B) and 
actually “causes a problem rather than helps solve anything” (B). It is a fact that in Jamaica 
and the wider region, US aid funding is wasted on maritime drug interdictions which are 
deemed as futile by relevant law enforcement authorities. 
 
While maritime drug interdictions feature heavily in the general rhetoric of  US 
and international anti-drugs policies, the interviewees were quick to point out the general 
hopelessness of  attempting to patrol a Caribbean island which can be accessed as a “360 
port” (G), without the correct infrastructure and support in place. According to one 
interviewee, “the fact is, we don’t have the capacity to intersect the boats coming into our 
ports. Our ports are porous” (F), and furthermore, “the marine police do not monitor it 
properly” (G). These law enforcement sentiments strengthen the argument that US 
funding for maritime drug interdictions in the region is futile, especially in countries 
where infrastructure is lacking.  
 
To conclude this section, the momentum behind initiatives such as the CBSI is 
driven by the US assumption that high-seas drug trafficking in the Caribbean remains a 
security threat to the US and wider international community. Conversely, the 
interviewees were quick to point out that in the present day, “[e]vidence doesn’t support 
the drug problem” (B) in the region, which continues to be hugely overestimated by the 
international community. Rather, the true nature of  the transnational drug problem in 
Jamaica is historical and “[p]eople remember the 80s and 90s, when you got on the wrong 
side of  a Jamaican drug dealer” (B). It is the “fear of  returning to a violent past” (B) 
associated with drug trafficking, which in turn helps to perpetuate a cycle of  futile 
funding; therefore overshadowing the greater issue of  firearms trafficking. The 
information gleaned from the interviewees is evidence of  the fact that US money is 
currently being channelled in the wrong direction, a point which section (b) below 
elaborates on in more detail.  
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4(b) Illicit Firearms Trafficking Constitutes the Main Security Threat 
 
This section of  the article is not intended to offer a detailed account of  firearms 
trafficking in the Caribbean (a broad topic which has been covered by a range of  scholars 
and practitioners including Agozino et al, 2009; Wells et al 2010; Baines, 2014). It should 
be noted however that, “[t]he weaponisation of  civil society in the Caribbean is connected 
to the market in illicit drugs” (Agozino et al, 2009:294), and could arguably have been 
(and continues to be), intensified by international efforts to curb regional drug trafficking. 
Harriott (2002) has documented alarming gun homicide rates in Jamaica, the Bahamas, 
Guyana, Saint Kitts and Trinidad and Tobago, from the 1980s through to the present day, 
with the escalation of  gun homicides most notable since the start of  the twenty first 
Century. For example, in 2008 the gun homicide rate in Jamaica was 55 per 100,000 
persons (population 2.7 million) and in 2007, Trinidad and Tobago’s rate was 26 per 
100,000 (population 1.3 million) (Agozino et al, 2009:290). The data gathered by Harriott 
and Agozino et al, is evidence that the continued, futile war on drugs masks a far more 
pressing issue.   
 
The purpose of  this section, is to identify and highlight the reality of  the current 
situation concerning organised crime in the Caribbean. This will be achieved by drawing 
on insights from senior law enforcement officers, to re-orientate the long-standing, 
international misreading that at the local level drugs trafficking is the main concern of  
Caribbean SIDS, when the reality is that the “pistolisation” or “weaponisation”, (Agozino 
et al, 2009) in these states is acutely aggravated by firearms trafficking from the US and 
therefore the main concern of  local law enforcement officers is gun homicide.  
 
Supplemental interview data emphasises that there is a collective of  knowledge 
from experienced, high-ranking law enforcement officers and policy advisors, who agree 
that the war on drugs in the Caribbean, is a guise to shift the lens from the main issue of  
illicit firearms trafficking from the US to regional SIDS. In the context of  Jamaica, but 
referencing the Caribbean generally, the interviewees freely expressed this notion: “People 
will say we have a drug problem in Jamaica. We have a gun problem” (C). “A major security 
threat for Jamaica is firearm trafficking” (F). All the interviewees agreed that the biggest 
threat to the collective security of  Caribbean SIDS (participants mentioned Jamaica, 
Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic), is not drug trafficking, but the 
illicit trafficking of  firearms from the US, and that solutions for these problems are not 
one and the same. The interview data therefore differs from similar, seminal, works 
published in the past decade, for example Bowling (2005, 2006, 2008) and Agozino et al 
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(2009), where 160 law-enforcement type officers were interviewed on the broad topic of  
policing and security in the Caribbean, with the authors asserting that their interviewees 
tended to think, “a robust response to drug trafficking would reduce the problem of  guns” 
(Agozino et al, 2009:296).  
  
More than a decade since Bowling conducted the interviews for his papers, our 
research shows that in 2019, participants agree that, “a major security threat for Jamaica 
is firearm trafficking [from the US]” (E), and that it presents the biggest challenge for 
law makers and enforcers in the region. Furthermore, the interviews conducted for this 
research highlight a fundamental dichotomy between the observations of  regional and 
US law enforcement officers, over what constitutes a security threat in their respective 
countries. The interviews show that Jamaican law enforcement officials are extremely 
concerned about the proliferation of  US manufactured firearms which are trafficked from 
the shores “of  the only major power that cares deeply about the Caribbean” (Abrams, 
1996:86). The officers view firearms trafficking as the main threat to collective regional 
security and do not feel that responses to drugs and guns are synonymous:  “The guns 
are a different story really [to the drugs] because that’s a problem for Jamaica.  A lot of  
firearms arrive from the US” (B). However, the US lens of  organised crime control 
remains focused on drugs and more recently, the lotto scam (an advance-fee fraud targeted 
at elderly US holiday makers staying in and around the Montego Bay area of  Jamaica) 
(Young, 2014).  
 
During each interview, the authors of  this paper began to see the emergence of  a 
variant to the fixed US rhetoric that drug trafficking is a foreign problem to be located 
and combated in other countries, including Jamaica, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
The Bahamas. Jamaican law enforcement officials were frustrated about the lack of  
assistance from the US in terms of  curbing its own home-grown security threat, this 
being the manufacturing of  firearms. It was repeatedly stated by the interviewees that, 
“[t]he bottom line is the guns come from the US to Jamaica. But when the JCF or law 
enforcement are looking for assistance back in the US it’s very slow in coming” (B).  
Another interviewee stated that as far back as 2007 he had attended the newly established 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador, El Salvador (one of  
many US government established ILEAs around the world which serve a broad range of  
foreign policy and law enforcement purposes for the US and for the world), and at the 
Academy he had: 
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[R]aised the same issue with the police, with representatives from the US and I 
highlighted that as a third world developing country in the region, we suffer from 
this influx of  weapons from the US which is creating a significant challenge for 
us [in Jamaica and the Caribbean] as  law enforcement (E). 
 
The “significant challenge” (E) was afforded global media coverage on 18 January 2018, 
when a State of  Emergency in the St James area of  Montego Bay was declared by Prime 
Minister Holness. The announcement was issued following a spate of  gun-related 
murders and crimes at the beginning of  the New Year. The prevalent crime issue in 
Jamaica is not the unquantifiable amount of  drugs thought to pass through the country, 
but the firearms which are flooding in from the US. The recent State of  Emergency in 
Jamaica, serves to underline the double standards which embody US law enforcement 
efforts abroad, whereby gun crime in Jamaica is viewed as a Jamaican problem which is 
disconnected from the US, while the latter concerns itself  with listing Caribbean 
countries including, The Bahamas, Haiti and Jamaica as major drug producing or transit 
countries (INCSR, 2017). However, such blacklists chime with general US policy rhetoric 
that, “what might be tolerated in distant lands….is far less acceptable in our front-yard” 
(Abrams, 1996:87). The frustration around these double standards is strongly reflected in 
conversations with the interviewees: 
 
There are so many contradictions (C, D, E). 
 
I highlighted [to US law enforcement] the example that if  narcotics are found on 
one of  our aircrafts leaving Jamaica to the US, there’s a penalty imposed (E). 
 
The US want a lot but they are not willing to give a lot. The [Jamaican] police 
will seize a gun and they will try and trace it back through the serial number but 
they keep running into brick walls because guns can be bought very easily and 
simply in the US. The record keeping in the US isn’t great (B). 
 
That firearms which are manufactured in the US and illegally trafficked to Jamaica, 
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago, are driving and perpetuating a 
culture of  gun crime in the region, is the reality (and not the assumption) of  the organised 
crime problem in the Caribbean.  One interviewee (C) indicated that the reluctance of  the 
US to take responsibility for the gun problem in Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS, may 
stem from the economic boom and remarkable growth that the US firearms and 
ammunitions industry is currently enjoying. The same interview participant added the 
disquieting comment that the, “US are not going to take on the responsibility of  security 
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of  another nation. It’s [firearms are] just another export product. The guns are coming 
also for the policemen” (C).  
 
Those seizures of  firearms which are newsworthy enough to warrant press 
attention are useful examples which demonstrate that shipments of  firearms frequently 
leave US air and sea ports bound for ports in Jamaica. On 13 November 2017, US law 
enforcement officers at Miami International Airport seized 119 assorted firearms and 267 
assorted rounds of  ammunition which were hidden in grocery boxes and ready for 
shipment to St James, Montego Bay (Gleaner, 2017b). In October 2017, “a major gun haul 
at a container terminal in Kingston” unearthed “19 guns, including six rifles” and rounds 
of  ammunition which had been hidden in two freezers (Gleaner, 2017c). While the 
interception of  illicit firearms can only be a good thing for law enforcement agencies, the 
issue remains that Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS are in essence “360 degree ports” 
(G) which are impossible to fully patrol in an effective and cost efficient manner. However, 
while local newspaper reports serve a purpose in aggrandising the aims of  US law 
enforcement in Jamaica, the interviewees remain sceptical about showboating these 
successes and are pragmatic about the significance of  them: 
 
The pat on the back seizures are highly publicised (B). 
 
Because of  this big shipment, the big seizure, we have proof  guns are coming from 
the US. Not in ones or twos, in big shipments (B). 
 
The interdictions that have been happening, happen on the lower level (F). 
 
While drug trafficking remains a blight in the history of  US-Caribbean relations, 
the security implication of  the US failure to stem the flow of  illicit firearms into Jamaica 
is a much more immediate and makes Jamaica’s so called drug problem look largely 
insignificant. Certainly, it is felt by Jamaican law enforcers that, “the threat for us is the 
importation of  firearms from the United States, which is significant, this year we have 
had over 1600 murders” (E) (January 2018). The Jamaica Constabulary Force Periodic 
Serious Crimes Review Weekly Jan 01 to July 15, 2017 and comparative six months for 
the years from 2014-2017 shows that there has been a steady and troubling increase in 
firearm related crimes including murder over a four year period. The number of  recorded 
fatal shootings has risen from 84 deaths in 2014 to 102 in 2017. The recorded number of  
seized firearms has also witnessed a trend in growth, with 360 firearms and 6452 rounds 
of  ammunition recovered in 2014, compared to 454 firearms 7874 rounds of  ammunition 
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recovered in 2017. Worryingly the seizures of  pistols within the firearms category saw 
the biggest increase with 289 pistols recovered in the six month period of  2017, compared 
to 2019 for the same period in 2014 (JCF Crime Statistics, 2017); reinforcing the views of  
Agozino et al (2009) that the pistolisation of  some Caribbean societies is being 
normalised.  
  
Pistols are the firearm of  choice in Jamaica and individuals upload video clips of  
their favourite brands to You Tube—these include models manufactured by Beretta, 
Ruger, Sig Sauer, Taurus and Heckler & Koch—all of  which are manufactured in the US. 
Newspaper and police reports also show that the brands of  firearms recovered in Jamaica 
are mainly manufactured in the US before being trafficked—a fact which was confirmed 
by the interview participants. That illicit firearms are being trafficked from the US 
(producing country) to consuming countries in the Caribbean is indisputable, with our 
interviewees reporting gun seizures in Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana; 
each seizure triggering frame-making headlines in the regional media (Jamaica Observer 
2016; Herrera 2016; Starbroek News, 2016), which feed into the international legal 
community’s perceptions of  stereotypes and racial ideologies (Foreman et al, 2016; 
Abraham and Appiah, 2006), and subsequent international legal responses. Notably, the 
UNODC in 2015 reported that 45 percent of  seized firearms moving through Trinidad 
and Tobago were destined for Jamaica (UNODC, 2015). Additionally, CBSI funded 
projects in Jamaica highlight the continuing “major US policy goal” of  providing CBSI 
funding to, “advance Jamaica’s transformation into a more secure, democratic and 
prosperous partner [to the US]” (INCSR, 2016). However, such initiatives neglect to 
address the real security threat that the US poses to Jamaica and the wider region, in 
terms of  the firearms which end up on the streets of  Jamaica and other SIDS. The authors 
therefore conclude this section by asserting that the US should acknowledge its role as 
an enabler of  firearms trafficking. 
 
5. Re-Conceptualising Organised Crime Control in Jamaica and Small 
Island Developing States 
 
The work so far has analysed the transposition of  US driven, Western organised crime 
control policies, from developed countries to Jamaica and Caribbean SIDS at the wider 
level. The paper has challenged the validity of  the general assumption that drug 
trafficking is an encompassing problem for Jamaica and Caribbean SIDS, and has 
unearthed that the most pressing problem faced by regional law enforcement officers, is 
the trafficking of  firearms from the US. 




Part five of  the paper seeks to add to the existing body of  knowledge on organised 
crime and its control in Jamaica and neighbouring SIDS, by moving beyond the current 
legal stalemate, which is the incongruity of  applying US policy assumptions in countries 
where the proliferation of  illicit firearms, is the most challenging, contemporary issue for 
law enforcement. The work suggests that organised crime control policies in the context 
of  Caribbean SIDS, need to be re-conceptualised, to better reflect the local conditions of  
SIDS. The re-conceptualisations outlined below are evidence-based soft policy 
implications which are grounded in the interview data. The novelty and originality of  the 
re-conceptualisations stems from the subjective experiences of  law enforcement officers 
and policy makers currently working in Jamaica (with peer connections in the wider 
region), and the intentions of  the authors to highlight the meanings and motives behind 
the dilemmas faced by law enforcement in Jamaica and beyond.  
 
5(a) Enhancing SIDS Participation in International Policy Making 
 
It has been shown that the current status quo in terms of  international organised crime 
control policy making is based on incorrect assumptions and influenced by the economic 
might of  the US, and does not represent the concerns of  regional SIDS. As stated by (B) 
“the US standard is not attainable for SIDS”. This results in the implementation of  flawed 
international policies at the local level, evidenced by the case study of  Jamaica. The 
research suggests the need for a paradigm shift in terms of  the weighting given to the 
voices of  SIDS within the international community—specifically at those negotiations 
where UN Conventions are decided and where American leverage means that regional 
responses to organised crime are constrained by the US priority of  drug trafficking (A, 
B, C) and the “difficult conditions attached to US funding” (C).  
 
The disparity between Caribbean SIDS and the US, in terms of  influencing and 
creating organised crime control policies in the region was recognised by the 
interviewees, who were aware of  practices whereby, “we [Caribbean SIDS] enter the 
arena with asymmetry. Sometimes we sign by force, not by choice. We are forced” (D). 
The interviewees were also keenly aware of  the fact that the “UN takes a keen look at 
countries who don’t sign up” (D) to Conventions, and felt that the scrutiny directed at 
Jamaica and other regional SIDS by the international law making organisation and the 
US was unfair. UN scrutiny of  SIDS is further bolstered by the support from sympathetic 
organisations such as the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime which 
has recently set up a project titled UNTOC Watch, which “aims to support the UN to 
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respond more effectively and systematically to threats posed by organized crime” (GI); 
the soft law making body that is the Financial Action Task Force and its regional body 
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force which obliges members to adopt and 
implement the 1988 Vienna Convention; and the Organization of  American States which 
is a UN regional agency and works closely with the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission to promote best practice in the area of  combating drug trafficking and 
money laundering (US DOJ, 2016). Scrutiny from Western organisations directed at 
Caribbean SIDS highlights that in the current day, as pertinently noted by Agozino et al, 
“the technologies of  domination” in the Caribbean and the policies they promote 
(2009:302), remain geared towards drug-interdictions and imperialistic sentiment—
rather than being tailored to country specificities. 
 
The intense frustration of  a country being required to work with laws which are 
not fit for purpose, was strongly identified by interviewee (D):  
 
Developed countries are at a stage of  development with the physical structure, 
mind-set, etc., so that they develop these conventions. The arrogance comes in 
where it is expected that third world developing countries are the same—that we 
can just sign and ratify. 
 
The research highlights the imbalance and double standards between SIDS and 
developed, rich, Western countries in international law making. Developed countries are 
high-income countries and usually identified as Member Countries of  the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development; of  which there are 35, including the US, 
UK, Canada, Australia and Switzerland (OECD, 2018). While a discussion of  the 
meanings attributed to the term Western countries, is outside the remit of  this paper’s 
discussion, it is important to note that some of  those Western countries considered to be 
the richest, also wield the most power in terms of  international law making, including 
directing the shape of  conventions, for example the Vienna Convention. Certainly, in the 
context of  this research, it was pointed out by the interviewees that economic coercion is 
used as a tool of  statecraft, whereby the US economic leverage means that the threat of  
sanctions over countries such as Jamaica is used, “to disrupt economic exchange with the 
target state, unless the target acquiesces to an articulated demand” (Drezner, 2001:3). It 
is evident that hard power and financial assistance from the US to Jamaica constrains 
Jamaican law enforcement responses to organised crime. This is also true of  other 
Caribbean SIDS which are in receipt of  funds drawn from programmes such as the CBSI. 
One interviewee stated that funding from the US to combat organised crime comes with 
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“their [the US”] own memorandum’ and if  countries do not sign up to agreements “there 
are ramifications” (C) (for example, trade sanctions and conditional ties). 
 
It is this coercion, which informs the resentment felt by regional law enforcement 
officers working in Caribbean SIDS, who are “force[d], not by choice” (D) to work with 
policies which are derived from US assumptions on organised crime and its control. 
According to Nye and as has been shown throughout this paper, “hard power, the ability 
to coerce, grows out of  a country’s military and economic might” and it is this coercion 
through the imposition of  assumptions and norms by the US on Caribbean SIDS, which 
has led to the current state of  the problems outlined in this paper, including the “attitudes 
of  distrust” towards US law enforcement and international policies (Nye, 2004:256-257). 
The reality of  coercion, and interference by the US in Jamaica’s affairs is most evident in 
the context of  the Tivoli siege, which concluded in the arrest and extradition of  
Christopher Michael (Dudus) Coke, with one interviewee remarking that the, “US 
dictated the terms of  the siege and then they withdrew. As a third world country we are 
penalised by the US” (D). The Tivoli siege, remains a tragic example of  counter-
productive results transpiring from US assumptions and Western policy direction; 31 
Jamaicans were caught in the crossfire and killed by firearms made in the US and obtained 
illegally (by Coke supporters) or legally (in the hands of  the military and law 
enforcement) (Helps, 2010). 
 
For Caribbean SIDS to possess enhanced capacity in international norm making, 
the interviewees for this paper tentatively suggested that CARICOM countries unite to 
challenge the concrete, rigid solutions presented by the US and international community. 
This re-conceptualisation of  the part that Caribbean SIDS play in international law 
making, was agreed on by interviewees (D), (E) and (F) who stated, “CARICOM as one 
voice can make the overture [for change] to the UN directly or the US”—although they 
were aware that such a re-conceptualisation would be a challenge for an organisation 
which is deemed by local commentators to be a “feel-good” project of  limited scope” 
(Johnston, 2013). While an in-depth discussion on the formation, structure (and failings) 
of  CARICOM is beyond the scope of  this paper’s focus, it should be noted that since it 
was established on 4 July 1973, CARICOM, is viewed by the interviewees as failing to 
harness its full potential in terms of  regional influence at the international level.  
  
While this paper has already suggested that Caribbean SIDS should unify their 
combined power under the auspices of  CARICOM, the authors are realistic in accepting 
that US interference in the affairs of  Caribbean SIDS is not about to diminish, as long as 
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these countries remain indebted to the US. The authors are pragmatic in suggesting the 
US should also embrace change, and adopt a “soft power” position if  it is not to be entirely 
discredited by regional law enforcement authorities. This re-conceptualisation would first 
require the US to prioritise illicit firearms trafficking as a problem starting in the US. 
Second, the US would need to consult with CARICOM states to draft and share soft policy 
implications tailored to the local conditions of  Caribbean SIDS including Jamaica. 
According to Nye (2004:256), “[s]oft power is the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments…Soft power arises from the attractiveness 
of  a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as 
legitimate in the eyes of  others, our soft power is enhanced”. For the US to gain credibility 
in terms of  combating organised crime in the Caribbean, it needs to recognise the 
potential of  Caribbean SIDS and law enforcement as allies and equals. 
 
Ultimately, SIDS need to be a part of  in-depth and fruitful dialogues which better 
inform the policy making decisions which affect them as developing countries. It is not 
enough for such countries to be invited to talks, if  the result is that policy is dictated by 
member countries with pre-established organised crime control agendas; ones which we 
have shown are inappropriate for developing island states. 
 
5(b) Capacity Building in Law enforcement and the Wider Community 
Capacity Building: Law Enforcement 
 
It has been shown under part three, that organised crime control strategies were 
constructed by government officials from developed nations. These nations, notably the 
US and other highly industrialised democracies formed the original G7, which first met 
in 1975. In the following decades, these countries chose to address problems that included 
drug trafficking and organised crime. Most member countries had large police arsenals 
available to them for fighting organised crime and some already had national law 
enforcement structures in place for that purpose. For example, the UK had its National 
Criminal Intelligence Service and National Crime Squad and France had L’Unite de 
Coordination et de Recherche Anti-Mafia (Scherer, 2009:95). The US, of  course, had the 
Federal Bureau of  Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other well-
resourced agencies such as Customs—all capable of  making tough responses to organised 
crime. As Scherer demonstrated, rich, developed nations influenced the thinking of  
influential international institutions such as the European Union, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and the OAS. Moreover, as has been shown 
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under part three of  this article, the US played a pivotal role in drafting the Vienna 
Convention and influencing international anti-narcotics assumptions and policies.  
 
In ensuring the commitment of  States to its conventions, the UN has often 
stressed the importance of  capacity building in law enforcement structures and criminal 
justice systems at the national level. Notably, in 1994, the UN Report of  the Secretary 
General (published following the World Ministerial Conference on Organised 
Transnational Crime) made the following point:  
 
Effective international cooperation often depends on the capacity of  the criminal 
justice system of  a given country. Raising the level of  knowledge, expertise and 
professionalism of  a criminal justice system requires resources that many 
countries lack. Technical assistance is then the only way of  ensuring that that 
structural difficulties are overcome (UNGA Report A/RES/49/159, 1994). 
 
However, speaking three decades later the interviewees emphasised that the US 
was not committed to law enforcement capacity building in Jamaica and the wider region. 
According to (B), “[p]oliceman arrive, there is a quick turnover and they have not 
contributed to capacity building”.  Furthermore, interviewees were quick to add that it is 
a fear of  “returning to a violent past” (B) fuelled by the drug trade, which has 
overshadowed the much greater issue of  firearms trafficking in the region. It is this fear, 
also, which perpetuates the prioritisation of  US anti-drug efforts in the Caribbean. While 
interviewees (A) and (B) agreed that officers from the US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and the US Drug Enforcement Agency are generally “here for a longer time 
[more than three months]” than those American officers tasked with dismantling the 
lotto scam they re-emphasised that on the whole, the US is not committed to law 
enforcement capacity building in Jamaica in the context of  combatting firearms 
trafficking effectively. The consequence of  such a blinkered approach, is that those issues 
which are peculiar and local to Jamaica (eg illicit firearms trafficking), are ignored by the 
US, despite the fact that the illicit trade in US-manufactured firearms presents a major 
security threat for Jamaica and neighbouring SIDS. The negative impact on law 
enforcement capacity building in Jamaica, in light of  US priorities on organised crime 
was highlighted by interviewee (B): “The Drug Enforcement Agency are specifically 
tasked with crimes which impact on the US and not committed to capacity building in the 
Jamaica Constabulary Force”. 
 
In light of  the comments made by the interviewees, the paper recommends that the US 
commits funding to supporting Jamaican law enforcement in its investigative abilities to 
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combat the most pressing local and regional problem of  illicit firearms, something which 
is currently lacking: “What they are not doing though, is giving the JCF the investigative 
ability to look at the problem as in the investigation” (B). The continued application of  
general US assumptions and policies (grounded in drug prohibition), to the local and 
regional problem of  firearms trafficking in Caribbean SIDS, will ultimately restrict the 
evolution of  appropriate organised crime control laws at the national and regional levels 
and continues to justify an escalating war on organised crime (Young, 2017). Due to the 
fact that “the branch is under resourced” (E), “the [US] money would be better spent on 
improving the standard of  investigative abilities of  the JCF” (A), by training local officers 
in all aspects of  criminal investigation and associated policing activities—thereby 
enhancing local counter organised crime capabilities, and creating law enforcement 
autonomy. It is important that countries like Jamaica, have the freedom to design and 
implement legal solutions which tally with the local conditions of  organised crime. For 
Caribbean SIDS generally, this means tackling illicit firearms trafficking as the priority.  
 
Capacity Building: Wider Community 
 
While the US commitment to law enforcement capacity building is clearly lacking, the 
interviewees also underlined the lack of  capacity building within the wider community, 
in the context of  the futile maritime drug interdictions. Interviewees underlined that 
maritime vessels purchased with US money to ensure Jamaica’s commitment to the war 
on drugs are a waste of  resources because of  a lack of  trained, local, maritime mechanics 
to maintain them. The suggestion that US money would be better spent on developing 
the capacity to train a specific workforce in Jamaica to build and maintain law enforcement 
vessels, was something that all the interviewees concurred with. The creation of  
apprenticeships in maritime engineering and boatbuilding would help to grow a skilled 
and local workforce and stimulate the economy. Currently, vessels are shipped back to the 
US to be maintained by external contractors. While physical equipment may be purchased 
for Jamaica, the interview subjects were vocal about the fact that, “the US is not committed 
to capacity building” within the wider community (B), and has a “narrow view on how to 
deal with it [the drug problem]” (A)—again highlighting the futility of  the maritime 
drug interdictions. Again, such views underline the fact that in 2018, Caribbean SIDS 
remain tied to a US anti-drug agenda applied to all forms of  organised crime; one which 
focuses on ensuring SIDS remain compliant with American demands if  they are to 
continue to receive aid funding. The 1994 Report of  the Secretary General stressed that 
a “fundamental purpose of  international cooperation is to contribute to the creation of  
self-reliant capacities in developing countries” (UNGA Report A/RES/49/159, 1994). 
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The views of  those interviewed for this project suggest that despite billions spent 
through CBSI and other initiatives there had been little contribution towards the creation 
of  self-reliant capacities in Jamaica.  
 
If  countries like Jamaica are to develop the self-reliant capacities favoured by the 
UN in order to ensure international cooperation on organised crime, it should be noted 
that these countries are also indebted countries. Jamaica and other Caribbean SIDS have 
reduced tariff  revenues in response to trade liberalisation set by international lending 
institutions most notably the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The 
economist Ha-Joon Chang argues that trade liberalisation in poorer countries such as 
Jamaica and other SIDS creates “lower levels of  business activity and higher 
unemployment” and that this ultimately contributes to “severe cuts in spending, often 
eating into vital areas like education, health and physical infrastructure, damaging long-
term growth” (Chang, 2007:69). With Jamaica experiencing vital budget cuts of  
$31billion in spending for 2018/19 (Hall, 2018), it is recommended that the US redirects 
money to contribute to capacity building in the wider community (eg boat building 
apprenticeships). Such a commitment by the US, would demonstrate a commitment to 
Jamaica, in terms of  ensuring that US policies and assumptions on organised crime can 
be facilitative by encouraging economic growth which can promote autonomy within a 
country such as Jamaica, and in the state services it provides, including law enforcement 




Jamaica and other SIDS have been required to follow a drug and organised crime control 
template that was created by the US and other developed nations; one which is not fit for 
the purposes of  small developing countries—as evidenced by the interviewees. The paper 
has explored, at the wider level, the general notion of  the failure of  exporting US derived 
organised crime control policies to SIDS. With reference to Jamaica as a country case 
study, the authors of  this paper reject the ill-informed orthodoxy that the template for 
international organised crime and drug control policy, (which was initially set by the US 
Organized Crime Control Act and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Control Act and first 
internationalised by the Vienna Convention), can be applied to all countries, regardless 
of  differences in socio-economic and political development. 
 
The research for this paper shows that the Americanisation of  organised crime and 
drug control policies is evident in the diktat meted out to Jamaican law enforcement 
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officers by American officials who continue to believe in the war on drugs. This paper has 
argued that following US assumptions and the international policies which they influence, 
is not in the interests of  Caribbean SIDS. In fact, the research conducted for this paper, 
suggests that problems regarding organised crime have not diminished in spite of  
adherence to US backed policies and agendas. It is notable that in 1998, the UN set a goal 
of  eliminating the illicit drugs problem by 2008 and pledged that by 2008, the world 
would be “drug free” (Arlacchi, 2008). Of  course, such a quixotic goal has not been 
achieved, and instead, it is this futile mission which informs the general Americanisation 
of  international law enforcement efforts to combat a myriad of  organised crime issues—
including firearms trafficking.  
 
In 1931, H B Chamberlin of  the Chicago Crime Commission, made the connection 
between unworkable laws and successful organised crime explicit. He wrote that: 
 
Organised crime is today a great, unmanageable threatening fact in the lives of  
our communities. It is not enough to ask whether the machinery of  law 
enforcement is good, we must go further, call in question the wisdom of  the laws 
themselves and discover whether or not some of  our experiments are not as 
menacing in their effect as criminal activities. It may be found that some of  the 
very best intentions of  our idealists have supplied the pavement for the hell of  
organized crime (668). 
 
In the context of  organised crime control in SIDS such as Jamaica, Chamberlin’s 
sentiments are still relevant nearly a century later. The research for this paper, has shown 
that “the wisdom of  laws” and conventions in terms of  organised crime control must be 
questioned in order to ensure that they are not futile in their effect and do not perpetuate 
“the hell of  organized crime” (Chamberlin, 1931:668), in countries, such as Jamaica, where 
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